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THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT UNION PACIFIC 
COMPLIED WITH UTAH CODE ANN. § 56-1-14 (1994) BY RINGING THE 
BELL ON THE TRAIN. 
hereby submits its Petition rui 
Rehearing Pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Counsel for petitioner 
hereby certifies that the petu ; presented in good y. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Defendant, Union Pacific Railroad Company brought a Motion For Summary 
Ji (hereinafter "trial court"). 
Summary Judgment was granted on May 15, 1995 i a Memorandum Decision with an 
Order Granting Summary Judgment dated June .\ :>peal to this Court was 
made by plaintiff Alecia Jensen, i his Court affirmed the summary judgment on two 
grounds and reversed on a third ground in a Memorandum Decision dated April 2b, 199b. 
For the Court's convenier ;opy of the Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision is 
attached hereto in the Addendum as Exhibit 1 and the Memorandum Decision and Order 
of the trial court as Exhibit 2. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In this Court's ruling on its third point, the Court reversed the trial court's decision 
on the questioi . -14(1994), 
because plaintiff Alicia Jensen's affidavit raised an issue of material fact regarding whether 
the required warning had been sounded by the train. See Memorandum Decision at 3-4. 
The (,i •• irt foci ISPII . ,r. Jensen's affidavit stating that she did not hear the whistle or horn. 
In the Court's reasoning this created an issue of material fact on whether the whistle was 
1 
sounded. Several related legal issues were discussed. However, the Court overlooked 
the issue of whether the statute was complied with by ringing the bell on the train as 
opposed to sounding the whistle. The Court overlooked the fact that there was no 
evidence presented by Jensen to dispute Union Pacific's properly supported undisputed 
testimony that the bell was rung in compliance with the statute for the requisite distance, 
and that the ringing of the bell served as a basis for the trial court's original grant of 
summary judgment. Thus, the trial court's ruling should have been upheld on that ground 
regardless of this Court's ruling on whether there was an issue of material fact regarding 
whether the whistle was blown. 
ARGUMENT 
A. There Are Two Alternative Ways To Comply With § 56-1-14 Either of 
Which is Sufficient. 
Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-14 (1994) provides two alternatives for warning travelers 
on a highway.1 First, a bell may be rung: 
Every locomotive shall be provided with a b_eji which shall be rung 
continuously from a point not less than eighty rods from any city or town 
street or public highway grade crossing until such city or town street or 
public highway grade crossing shall be crossed.... 
(Emphasis added.) In the alternative, the statute provides that a whistle may be sounded 
instead of a bell: 
... but, except in towns and at terminal points, the sounding of the locomotive 
whistle or siren at least one-fourth of a mile before reaching any such grade 
crossing shall be deemed equivalent to ringing the bell as aforesaid.... 
(Emphasis added.) 
1The full text of the statute is contained as part of Exhibit A to the Addendum to the 
Brief of Appellant. 
2 
The Utah Supreme Court, in dicta, confirmed the alternative nature of the statute's 
requirements in Curtis v. Harmon Electronics. Inc.. 575 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Utah 1978). 
The statute [56-1-14] requires a bell to be rung for 80 rods (one quarter mile) 
before the crossing, for the purpose of warning approaching traffic of the 
train's approach. The sounding of the whistle is a substitute for the bell.... 
The clear intent of the statute is to require either the ringing of a bell or the 
sounding of a whistle for one quarter of a mile before entering the crossing. 
(Emphasis added.) 
B. The Trial Court Relied On The Sounding Of Both Warnings In Its Ruling. 
The trial court's Order Granting Summary Judgment held the statute had been 
complied with under both alternatives: "(3) That defendant did sound the train's bell and 
whistle as it approached the crossing." (Emphasis added.) 
The trial court's Memorandum Decision confirms this. The trial court wrote: 
"Defendant alleges that its engineer began sounding the locomotive whistle and bell...", 
citing the Affidavit of Ryan Puffer, fflj 7-8 submitted by defendant. Memorandum Decision 
at 3. The trial court also noted that defendant was arguing that Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-14 
(1994) requires either a whistle or bell to be sounded and defendant argued both were 
being sounded. Trial Court's Memorandum Decision at 15. The trial court continued and 
reviewed the evidence submitted by plaintiff, explained why the train speed graph failed 
to show whistles and bells (it was not set up to record these items), rejected statements 
of witnesses who heard no warning for failure to provide them in affidavit form, noted that 
it was not shown that such witnesses were in a position to hear warnings in any event, and 
concluded "(c) that defendant did sound the train's bells and whistle as it approached the 
crossing". Jd at 16-17 (emphasis added). 
3 
C. This Court Considered Only The Whistle Alternative And Overlooked 
Complying With The Statute By Ringing The Bell. 
This Court focused on the issue of whether a plaintiff needs to establish that 
witnesses were affirmatively listening for warnings or lay a foundation for negative 
testimony. Memorandum Decision at 3-4. The Court noted that Jensen had submitted an 
affidavit in which she stated she did not hear the train whistle and that only one sworn 
statement was necessary to create an issue of fact. Jgl at 32. The Court concluded that 
the trial court had thus incorrectly determined that no genuine issues of material fact 
existed on the question of whether the train sounded warnings as required by the statute. 
Jglat4. 
The Court overlooked the fact that there was no sworn statement controverting 
defendant's undisputed fact (Puffer Affidavit, cited supra) that the bell was being rung 
which alone would prove compliance with the statute. Jensen's affidavit specifically dealt 
only with the whistle. ("I did not hear the train blow its whistle or sound its horn anytime 
prior to the collision.") No other sworn statements were submitted. Thus, it is 
uncontradicted and there is no genuine issue of material fact that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 56-1-14 (1994) was complied with by ringing the bell. This is a valid ground to uphold 
the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Therefore, defendant respectfully requests 
the Court to reconsider this matter on that ground. A 
A /• II "** 
DATED this 9th day of May, 1996. / ) /)' / A / 
2The affidavit is contained as part of Exhibit F to the Addendum of the Brief of 
Appellant. 
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ADDENDUM 
Tabl 
CriSE TITLE: 
Alicia Jensen, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. Case No. 950754-CA 
Union Pacific Railroad, Inc., 
Defendant and Appellee. 
April 25, 1996. MEMORANDUM DECISION (Not For Official Publication). 
Memorandum Decision of the Court by NORMAN H. JACKSON, Judge; MICHAEL 
J. WILKINS, Judge, concurs; and PAMELA T. GREENWOOD, Judge, concurs in part 
and dissents in part, with separate opinion. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of April, 1996, a true and 
correct copy of the attached MEMORANDUM DECISION was deposited in the 
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Allen K. Young 
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Springville, Utah 84663 
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and a true and correct copy of the attached MEMORANDUM DECISION was 
deposited in the United States mail to the district court judge listed 
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Honorable Boyd L. Park 
Fourth District Court 
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si aiMJ^ Judicial Secretary 
TRIAL COURT: 
Fourth District Court, Utah County, Case No. 940400280 
FILED 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Alicia Jensen, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Union Pacific Railroad, Inc., 
Defendant and Appellee. 
APR 2 5 1996 
COURT OF APPEALS 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Not F o r O f f i c i a l P u b l i c a t i o n ) 
C a s e No . 9 5 0 7 5 4 - C A 
F I L E D 
( A p r i l 2 5 , 1 9 9 6 ) 
Fourth District, Utah County 
The Honorable Boyd L. Park 
Attorneys: Allen K. Young, Springville, for Appellant 
J. Clare Williams, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Greenwood, Jackson, and Wilkins. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Alicia Jensen appeals the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of Union Pacific Railroad, Inc. (Union 
Pacific) . We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. 
We review grants of summary judgment for correctness. See 
Higgins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). "We 
do not defer to the trial court's conclusion that facts are 
undisputed nor its legal conclusions supported by those facts." 
Oquirrh Assocs. v. First Nat'1 Leasing Co.. 888 P.2d 659, 662 
(Utah App. 1994) . Jensen raises three issues on appeal. We 
address each in turn. 
First, Jensen claims Union Pacific was negligent because 
event recorders show the train was traveling up to 1.3 miles per 
hour in excess of its maximum timetable speed of 50 miles per 
hour just minutes before the accident. Excessive speed of a 
train or other vehicle is the cause of an accident only when it 
prevents the driver from slowing down, stopping, or controlling 
the vehicle to avoid the collision, or when it misleads the 
driver of another vehicle. See Horsley v. Robinson. 112 Utah 
227, 239-41, 186 P.2d 592, 597-99 (1947); see also Dombeck v. 
Chicago. M.. St. P. & Pac. Ry.. 129 N.W.2d 185, 193 (Wis. 1964) 
(holding refusal to submit question of train's speed to jury 
correct because evidence could not support finding that excessive 
speed was causal). 
Jensen assumes that had the train been traveling one or two 
miles per hour slower, it could have stopped or slowed 
sufficiently to avoid the accident. "Trains cannot be stopped in 
time to avoid collisions if the time interval is shortened to a 
matter of . . . seconds." Van Wagoner v. Union Pac. R.R.. 112 
Utah 189, 203-04, 186 P.2d 293, 301 (1947). Former Justice 
Crockett declared: 
It is contrary to the generally known laws of 
physics and common sense to expect the train, 
with its great weight and momentum, to stop 
within the short distance available after the 
instant it should have become apparent that 
[the plaintiff] was not going to stop. After 
that point was reached, there is nothing the 
crew could have done to avoid the collision. 
And this true whether the train was 
travelling fast or slow and whether the crew 
saw [the plaintiff] or not. 
Gregory v. Denver & Rio Grande w. P.P.. 8 Utah 2d 114, 118, 329 
P.2d 407, 409 (1958) (Crockett, J., concurring). Thus, a train's 
speed generally cannot be the cause of crossing collisions as a 
matter of law. 
Further, in the present case, the train's speed was well 
within the federally mandated 60-miles-per-hour limit for the 
track in question. See 49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a) (1994). The train's 
speed was also within Union Pacific's timetable speed limit. 
Speed indicators on trains must be accurate within plus-or-minus 
5 miles per hour at speeds over 30 miles per hour. See 49 C.F.R. 
§ 229.117 (1994). Thus, the speed indicator's reading of 51.3 
miles per hour places the train within Union Pacific's timetable 
speed limit of 50 miles per hour. Jensen cannot prove negligence 
per se based simply on a reading of 1.3 miles per hour over the 
50-miles-per-hour maximum. Such a claim would have to be based 
on a reading in excess of 55 miles per hour. The trial court 
correctly determined Jensen's claim of negligent train speed must 
fail as a matter of law, and we affirm the trial court's ruling 
on that issue.1 
1. We do not address Union Pacific's contention that federal law 
preempts Jensen's claim of negligent train speed under CSX 
Transp.. Tnc. v. Easterwood. 507 U.S. 658, 113 S. Ct. 1732 
(1993). Like the trial court, we conclude the train's speed 
could not have been a cause of the accident as a matter of law. 
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Second, Jensen asserts the crossing was more than ordinarily 
hazardous because a Utah Livestock Auction is held nearby on a 
weekly basis, creating traffic congestion and noise sufficient to 
obstruct the view of and muffle warning signals of on-coming 
trains. Liability of railroads for more-than-ordinarily-
hazardous crossings is limited to obstructions either created by 
the railroad or located on the railroad's right of way. See 
Duncan v. Union Pac. R.R.. 842 P.2d 832, 834 (Utah 1992); Gleave 
v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R.. 749 P.2d 660, 663-64 (Utah App. 
1988). Any obstructions making the instant crossing more than 
ordinarily hazardous were beyond the control of Union Pacific. 
Union Pacific did not create any obstruction at the crossing, and 
its right of way was free of obstructions. The trial court 
correctly determined Jensen could not establish liability for a 
more than ordinarily hazardous crossing as a matter of law, and 
we affirm the trial court's ruling on that issue. 
Third, Jensen contends Union Pacific is negligent because it 
failed to comply with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-
14 (1994). Utah law requires trains to sound warnings beginning 
one-quarter mile before every grade crossing. It is not 
necessary for plaintiffs to establish that witnesses were 
affirmatively listening for the warnings or "paying particular 
attention to the thing observed [or not observed]." Seybold v. 
Union Pac. R.R., 121 Utah 61, 66, 239 P.2d 174, 177 (1951). 
"'All that need appear is that the witness was so situated in 
relation to the train at the time it is claimed the warnings were 
given that said warnings would have awakened her attention to 
them.'" Curtis v. Harmon Slecs.. Inc.. 575 P.2d 1044, 1047 (Utah 
1978) (quoting Hudson v. Union Pac. R.R.. 120 Utah 245, 251, 233 
P.2d 357, 360 (1951)). Additionally, whether a train sounded 
required warnings has been a factual question for juries to 
decide since before statehood. See, e.g.. Smith v. Rio Grande W. 
Ry., 9 Utah 141, 143, 33 P. 626, 627 (1893). 
In response to Union Pacific's motion for summary judgment, 
Jensen submitted an affidavit in which she stated she did not 
hear the train whistle. "'[I]t only takes one sworn statement 
under oath to dispute the averments on the other side of the 
controversy and create an issue fact.'" Draper City v. Estate of 
Bernardo. 888 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah 1995) -(quoting Holbrook Co. 
v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975)). Nonmoving parties need 
not rebut affidavit evidence at the summary judgment stage of 
litigation, they need only controvert such statements and thus 
create a genuine issue of material fact. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c). We also observe 
[w]hile generally positive testimony (such as 
I heard the whistle) is better than negative 
testimony (such as I did not hear the 
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whistle) the district court may not accept 
positive testimony to the exclusion of 
negative -estimonv on a motion for summary 
judgment. It is a credibility question 
whether one witness' memory is more reliable 
than another witness' memory, and such 
credibility determinations are not to be made 
on a motion for summary judgment. 
Easterwood v. CSX Transp., Inc.. 933 F.2d 1548, 1560 n.14 (11th 
Cir. 1991), afffd. 507 U.S. 658, 676, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 1744 
(1993) (emphasis added). 
Union Pacific claims Jensen cannot rely on her affidavit to 
create an issue of fact because it contradicts her previous 
answers to interrogatories.2 However, Union Pacific's 
interrogatories did not specifically ask whether Jensen heard the 
whistle; thus, her affidavit does not contradict her prior sworn 
statements. Union Pacific also claims Jensen's affidavit did not 
include statements that she was paying sufficient attention to 
have heard the whistle had it been sounded. Despite the 
dissent's acceptance of this argument, we can find no Utah law 
requiring nonmoving parties to lay such an evidentiary foundation 
in an affidavit opposing summary judgment. Nonmoving parties 
need only controvert the moving party's assertions, thus creating 
a genuine issue of fact. Accordingly, the trial court 
incorrectly determined that no genuine issues of material fact 
existed on the question of whether tr±e train sounded warnings as 
required by Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-14 (1994), and we reverse the 
trial court's ruling on that issue. 
In sum, we affirm the trial court's rulings on the issues of 
the train's excessive speed and Union Pacific's liability for a 
more-than-ordinarily-hazardous crossing. We reverse the trial 
court's ruling on the question of whether Union Pacific complied 
2. The rule relating to affidavits that contradict prior sworn 
testimony grows from cases in which an affidavit contradicts an 
earlier deposition. Courts have reasoned that deposition 
testimony is more reliable than an affidavit because it is 
subject to cross examination. See, e.g., Webster v. Sill. 675 
P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983). Such is not the case here. 
Answers to interrogatories, like affidavits, are sworn statements 
made without cross examination; one sworn statement is not more 
probative than another merely because it was made first. 
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with Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-14 (1994) and remand the matter for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I CONCUR: 
Michael J. Wilkins, Judge 
GREENWOOD, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part) : 
I concur in the majority opinion's analysis regarding the 
speed of the train and whether the crossing was more than 
ordinarily hazardous. I respectfully dissent, however, from the 
majority's determination that there is a material issue of fact 
on the question of whether the defendant complied with Utah Code 
Ann. § 56-1-14 (19 94) by sounding the required warnings. In my 
view, plaintiff did not adequately rebut defendant's evidence 
that such warnings were sounded. Caselaw in Utah and elsewhere 
regarding the probative value of negative testimony in similar 
cases holds that the witness must have been positioned so "it is 
reasonable to suppose he would have observed had it occurred or 
the fact existed." Sevbold v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.. 121 Utah 61, 
66, 239 P.2d 174, 177 (1951). See also. Curtis v. Harmon Elecs.. 
Inc.. 575 P.2d 1044, 1047 (Utah 1978) (noting that witness's 
testimony valueless when attention elsewhere); Hudson v. Union 
Pac. R.R. Co.. 120 Utah 245, 251, 233 P.2d 357, 360 (1951) 
(noting that witness must be situated so that warnings would have 
"awakened her attention to them"); Bebout v. Norfolk & Western 
Ry. Co.. 982 F.2d 1178, 1179-80 (7th Cir. 1993) (discussing 
Illinois rule that negative evidence is probative only if witness 
close enough to hear and is paying sufficient attention to have 
heard). 
Plaintiff's affidavit that she did not hear any warnings, 
and may have been playing a "wish" game at the time of the 
collision, is bereft of assertions she was paying sufficient 
attention to have heard the warnings if they were sounded. 
950754-CA 5 
Consequently, I would affirm the trial court's decision in its 
entirety. 
Pamela T. Greenwoo 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALECIA JENSEN, 
vs. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD, 
Plaintiff, 
INC., 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 940400280 
DATE May 15, 1995 
JUDGE BOYD L. PARK 
This matter came before the Court on April 17, 1995 for oral argument on 
defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment. The Court, having received and reviewed the 
motion, memorandum in support, memorandum in opposition, reply memorandum, and 
supplemental reply memorandum; having heard oral arguments; and having reviewed the 
applicable law, now makes the following findings and conclusions: 
1. This Court has jurisdiction to decide this case. Although plaintiff is a resident of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, defendant Union Pacific Railroad is a Utah corporation 
authorized to do business in the State of Utah and in Utah County, State of Utah. The 
accident which gave rise to this cause of action occurred in Utah County, State of Utah, and 
therefore jurisdiction and venue are properly vested in this Court. 
2. On February 5, 1994, the parties were involved in a collision between defendant's 
train and plaintiff's automobile. Plaintiff was a passenger in her automobile, which was 
crossing the railroad tracks at approximately 5950 South 650 West in Utah County when the 
automobile was struck by a train owned and operated by defendant. Plaintiff alleges she 
suffered severe and permanent injuries as a direct and proximate result of this collision. 
3. On February 7, 1995 defendant filed with this Court a Motion For Summary 
Judgment and an accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion 
For Summary Judgment. On March 2, 1995 plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition to 
Memorandum Decision 940400280 
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Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment and a Request for Hearing on Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment. On March 15, 
1995 Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment was 
filed. On April 12, 1995 Defendant's Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Motion For Summary Judgment was filed with the Court. Oral arguments on this motion 
were heard on April 17, 1995. 
4. The accident giving rise to this cause of action occurred at approximately 12:10 
p.m. on February 5, 1994 at a public railroad crossing of defendant's Provo Subdivision 
mainline trackage located near 650 West and 5950 South in Spanish Fork, Utah County. At 
the time of the accident, plaintiffs automobile was being driven by plaintiffs boyfriend, 
Bruce Brinkmeier, also a minor at the time of the accident. Brinkmeier was cited for driving 
without a license. The train in question was an empty coal train with three locomotives and 
46 trailing empty coal cars. The train weighed 1424 tons and was 2622 feet in length. 
5. According to the train's engineer, the train was traveling from Milford to Provo in 
a southwest to northeast direction. See Affidavit of Ryan Puffer, defendant's Memorandum 
in Support, Exhibit D. The trackage at that location is relatively straight and flat. See 
Affidavit of Lawrence Curley, defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit B, at f 5(e). 
Plaintiffs automobile was traveling southbound on 650 West. The road (650 West) is 
straight and flat for hundreds of feet before reaching the crossing. Id. The trackage and 
road intersect at an angle greater than 90 degrees with reference to the directions of approach 
of the train and car. Id. at ^ 5(a). 
6. The crossing is located in a rural farming area and is surrounded by open fields on 
the approach side. A Utah Livestock Auction building and animal pens are located in the 
southwest quadrant of the crossing intersection, which is on the opposite side of the tracks 
from which plaintiffs automobile approached. The northwest quadrant, which is the view 
quadrant for the approaching train and car, is an open field. See Affidavit of Lawrence 
Curley, defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit B. At the time of the accident, a 
Memorandum Decision 940400280 T 
livestock auction was taking place. There was a considerable amount of traffic, and trucks 
and trailers were parked near the crossing. 
7. An advance stop sign warning sign was posted alongside 650 West approximately 
572 feet north of the crossing. Also posted were an advance railroad crossing warning sign, 
an advance railroad crossing sign painted on the road, railroad crossing "crossbuck" signs, 
and a stop sign. See Affidavit of Lawrence Curley, defendant's Memorandum in Support, 
Exhibit B. 
8. Defendant alleges that its engineer began sounding the locomotive whistle and bell 
approximately 1/4 mile away from the 5950 South crossing and continued to sound them up 
to the point of the accident at the 650 West crossing. See Affidavit of Ryan Puffer, H 7-8, 
defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D. The distance between the 5950 South and 
650 West crossings is approximately 1,100 feet. See Affidavit of Lawrence Curley, 
defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit B, at 1 5(b). 
9. At about the time the train passed over the 5950 South crossing, the engineer 
noticed a truck pulling a horse trailer begin to drive over the tracks in a southbound 
direction. Shortly after seeing the truck/horse trailer clear the crossing, the engineer noticed 
plaintiffs automobile rolling towards the crossing. The car was following a few seconds 
behind the truck/horse trailer and moving past the stop sign. The engineer placed the train in 
emergency braking immediately upon seeing the car. See Affidavit of Ryan Puffer, ^f 9-
11, defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D. 
10. The train was a few hundred feet from the crossing when the engineer first saw 
plaintiffs car approaching the intersection. See Affidavit of Ryan Puffer, ^ 10, defendant's 
Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D. It took the train approximately 1,400 feet to stop after 
emergency braking was initiated. See Affidavit of Lawrence Curley, defendant's 
Memorandum in Support, Exhibit B, at ^ 5(g). The left side of the snowplow of the leading 
locomotive struck the right front portion of the car. See Affidavit of Ryan Puffer, 1 10, 
defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D; Affidavit of Lawrence Curley, defendant's 
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Memorandum in Support, Exhibit B, at f 4(g)-(h). Both occupants were ejected from the car 
and thrown in the same northeasterly direction. Neither occupant was wearing a seatbelt. 
11. Defendant alleges that plaintiff and Brinkmeier played a "wish" game upon arrival 
at the crossing, lifting their feet from the floor of the car and looking for something metallic 
within the car to touch with their fingers while simultaneously making a wish and crossing 
the tracks. Plaintiff admits this, but asserts that she has no recollection of doing so just prior 
to the collision. The parties agree, for the purpose of the summary judgment motion, that 
plaintiff and Brinkmeier never saw or heard the train prior to impact. 
12. The parties agree that the "authorized speed limit" for the trackage in question was 
set by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) at 60 m.p.h. for freight trains and 80 
m.p.h. for passenger trains. However, defendant Union Pacific voluntarily filed with the 
FRA a lower "timetable" speed of only 50 m.p.h. for its freight trains. Plaintiff argues that 
it is this timetable speed that applies rather than the FRA's authorized speed limit of 60 
m.p.h. 
13. Defendant claims that the train was traveling between 49 and 51 m.p.h. for at least 
the last three miles before the engineer initiated emergency braking. See Affidavit of Ryan 
Puffer, t 5, defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D; Affidavit of George E. 
Ohlsson, 1 7, defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit F. Plaintiff argues that the train 
was traveling an average speed of 51.5 m.p.h. for the three minutes prior to the collision. 
See Affidavit of Dennis Andrews, f 8, Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 2. 
14. Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact 
exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See U.R.C.P. 56; 
Ehlers & Ehlers Architects v. Carbon County, 805 P.2d 789 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Furthermore, "[ajlthough summary judgment may on occasion be appropriate in negligence 
cases, it is appropriate only in the most clear-cut case." Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 
126, 126 (1987) (citing Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982)). 
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15. Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment addresses three areas of analysis: 1) 
Union Pacific was not negligent in traveling in excess of the timetable speed limit; 2) Union 
Pacific did not fail to reduce the speed of its train through what plaintiff alleged to be a 
"more than ordinarily hazardous crossing"; and 3) Union Pacific complied with requirements 
of U.C.A. § 56-1-14, which governs the use of whistles and bells when approaching railroad 
crossings. The Court will analyze these issues individually. 
Authorized Speed Limit 
16. Although the FRA has set the speed limit for freight trains at 60 m.p.h., Union 
Pacific has voluntarily chosen to set a lower "timetable" speed limit of 50 m.p.h. for its 
freight trains, 10 m.p.h. below the speed limit mandated by the FRA. According to 
plaintiffs accident reconstructionist, the train was averaging a speed of 51.5 m.p.h. for the 
three minutes prior to the collision. See Affidavit of Dennis Andrews (Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, Exhibit 2). At 
oral arguments, plaintiff presented a speed graph obtained from the train's recorder. That 
graph indicated variations in the train's speed prior to the accident, and recorded the train's 
speed as varying from 50 m.p.h. to as much as 52.5 m.p.h. 
17. Based on data retrieved from the train's Pulse Electronics "speed recorder" device 
which electronically recorded the train's speed on tape prior to the accident, defendant claims 
that the train was traveling between 49 and 51 m.p.h. for at least the last three miles before 
emergency braking was initiated. See Affidavit of George Ohlsson (defendant's 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment, 
Exhibit F); see also Pulse Electronic printout (defendant's Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment, Exhibit A). In the Affidavit of 
George E. Ohlsson, Manager of Operating Practices for Union Pacific Railroad (see 
defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit F), Mr. Ohlsson stated the following: 
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It is difficult for even the most competent engineer to maintain a long and 
heavy train at a certain and undeviating speed. The curvature and 
undulation of the trackage will retard and increase the speed of a long and 
heavy train even though an engineer is holding a steady throttle on the 
locomotive. A train which travels for a number of miles at a speed which 
does not deviate more than one or two miles an hour is, in my 
professional opinion, going at a steady speed. It is simply not possible to 
control a train's speed any better than that. 
Id. at 1 8. 
18. Defendant argues that the FRA's "authorized speed limit" of 60 m.p.h. for freight 
trains preempts plaintiffs claim of excessive speed. Defendant cites CSX Transportation, 
Inc. v. Easterwood, 113 S.Ct. 1732 (1993) in support of its argument that plaintiffs claims 
of common law negligence are unfounded. In Easterwood, the plaintiff sued for the death of 
her husband resulting from a railroad crossing accident, alleging that CSX was negligent 
under Georgia law for failing to maintain adequate warning devices at the crossing and for 
operating the train at an excessive speed. The authorized speed limit for the track in 
Easterwood was set at 60 m.p.h. and, while conceding that the train was traveling at a speed 
under 60 m.p.h., Easterwood nevertheless claimed that CSX breached its common-law duty 
to operate its train at a moderate and safe rate of speed. 
19. The federal regulations involved in Easterwood had been issued by the Secretary of 
Transportation pursuant to the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA), which 
established an authorized speed limit of 60 m.p.h. for freight trains. A clause of the FRSA 
permits states to adopt or continue in force any state law, rule, regulation, order, or standard 
relating to railroad safety until such time as the Secretary adopted a regulation covering the 
subject matter of such state requirement. The preemption clause of the FRSA (45 U.S.C.S. 
§ 434) confers on the Secretary of Transportation the power to preempt state common law. 
Given the Secretary's adoption of train-speed regulations pursuant to the FRSA (49 C.F.R. § 
213.9(a)), a state's common-law restrictions on train speed are not preserved by a saving 
clause in 45 U.S.C.S. § 434, under which a state may continue in force an additional or 
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more stringent law relating to railroad safety when necessary to eliminate or reduce an 
essentially local safety hazard and when not incompatible with any federal law. Easterwood, 
113 S.Ct. at 1743 (1993). 
20. The Court in Easterwood found for CSX, who had argued that Easterwood's claim 
was preempted because the federal speed limits are regulations covering the subject matter of 
the common law of train speeds. The Court further stated that to hold otherwise would be to 
deprive the Secretary of the power to preempt state common law, a power clearly conferred 
by § 434. Therefore, the Court found that Easterwood's reliance on the common law was 
incompatible with both the FRSA and the Secretary's regulations. Id. at 1743. 
21. In the case now before this Court, defendant argues that its train was traveling well 
below the federally imposed speed limit of 60 m.p.h. for freight trains. "The fact that the 
Union Pacific had set a lower 'timetable' speed limit than that specified by the FRA is 
irrelevant since any claim based upon a violation of the railroad set limit would be but a 
variation of plaintiffs common law negligence claim of excessive or unreasonable speed." 
See Defendant's Memorandum in Support at 8, t 1-
22. Plaintiff argues that, because defendant filed its timetable with the FRA pursuant to 
49 C.F.R. 217, the Court should consider that action as evidence that the maximum 
authorized speed at the intersection of the collision is 50 m.p.h. and that timetables filed with 
the FRA are therefore enforceable against the defendant, and train speeds in excess of those 
timetables violate federal law. See Affidavit of Bruce Reading (plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Opposition, Exhibit 1). Furthermore, plaintiff claims that this case is distinguishable from 
Easterwood because there is no attempt to impose on Union Pacific a state-enforced speed 
regulation which is more stringent than its federal counterpart. Instead, plaintiff claims that 
defendant's train was exceeding its own maximum authorized timetable speed, thus violating 
federal law, and that defendant was therefore negligent. 
23. Given the ruling in Easterwood and the parties' arguments, the issue now before the 
Court is (a) whether Union Pacific's timetable speed of 50 m.p.h. for freight trains is a 
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variation of plaintiffs common law negligence claim of excessive speed and thus preempted 
by federal law governing the"subject area," or (b) whether the FRSA covers speed limits 
self-imposed by Union Pacific and, if not, whether defendant was negligent in exceeding its 
speed limit for freight trains. 
24. The FRSA specifically permits states to adopt or continue in force any state law, 
rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad safety until such time as the Secretary 
adopts a regulation covering the subject matter of such state requirement. This legislation 
was designed to prevent states from interfering with regulations established by the FRA. In 
this case, it is clear that the FRA had designated an "authorized speed limit" of 60 m.p.h. 
for freight trains traveling along this stretch of track. However, the State of Utah has not 
attempted to impose a more stringent law, rule, or regulation regarding authorized train 
speed. Instead, Union Pacific has created its own timetable speed of 50 m.p.h. The Court 
finds the present case to be distinguishable from Easterwood, where the State of Georgia 
tried to impose law, rules, or regulations governing train speed. The Court in Easterwood 
did not explain how the FRSA addresses the question of timetable speeds which are a) self-
imposed by railroad companies and not by States; and b) lower than the federally authorized 
train speeds. 
25. In his affidavit, plaintiffs witness Bruce Reading alleges that, under federal law, 
each railroad company is required to file a copy of its Operating Rules and Timetables with 
the FRA, and concludes that the speed limits mandated in the Union Pacific Railroad 
Company Operating Rules and Timetables thus become the federally mandated guidelines and 
maximum speed limits for the railroad company and are enforceable by the FRA. See 
Affidavit of Bruce Reading, W 4-9, Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 1. 
Accordingly, Union Pacific's self-imposed timetable speed of 50 m.p.h. would become its 
federally authorized speed and could not be preempted by the FRA. 
26. Defendant argues that 49 C.F.R. § 217 does not authorize timetables to change the 
federal speed limits set in 49 C.F.R. § 213.9 and that timetable filings therefore have no 
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effect on the maximum speeds at which a railroad may operate its trains. According to 
defendant, section 217 requires only the filing of operating rules and timetables, which may 
or may not contain speed limits, and does not require that speed limit changes be filed with 
the FRA. Defendant again turns to the Easterwood decision and argues that it is § 213.9 
which sets the "ceiling" or "maximum" speed, not timetables, and asserts that "[i]mplicit in 
such holding is the understanding that while a railroad may not exceed such limit, it may by 
internal fiat voluntarily operate its trains at any slower speed deemed appropriate." See 
Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support at 4. 
27. The Easterwood case does not provide any clear rule as to how one should address 
the issue of timetable speeds within 49 C.F.R. §§ 217 and 213.9. However, plaintiff has 
equally failed to provide any case law which would substantiate her claim that Union 
Pacific's timetable filing under § 217 has an effect on the maximum speed at which a 
railroad may operate its train under § 213.9. Defendant has provided the Court with the 
recent case of Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Oregon, 9 F.3d 807 
(9th Cir. 1993), which supports defendant's argument that the FRA, by requiring Union 
Pacific to file its timetable speed limits, does not thereby adopt that timetable limit as a 
federal law enforceable against the railroad and preemptive of the speed limits set forth in 49 
C.F.R. §213.9. In Southern Pacific, an Oregon law permitted local authorities to ban the 
sounding of locomotive whistles under certain conditions. Southern Pacific Transportation 
Company argued that the state law was preempted by three federal statutes and moved for 
summary judgment. The state of Oregon made a cross-motion for summary judgment, 
claiming that its regulations were not preempted as a matter of law. Following the Supreme 
Court's decision in Easterwood, the circuit court held that the state law and regulations were 
not preempted by any of the three federal statutes cited by Southern Pacific and affirmed the 
district court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the State of Oregon. 
28. In addressing Southern Pacific's claim that the Oregon statute was also preempted 
by 45 C.F.R. § 217, which requires railroads to keep their operating rules on file with the 
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FRA, the circuit court stated that M[b]ecause the FRA neither approves nor adopts the 
railroad's rules in any manner, the rules do not have the force of law and therefore cannot 
preempt the Oregon statute." Southern Pacific, 9.F3d at 812 n.5. This statement is equally 
applicable in the case now before this Court, in that it supports defendant's argument that 49 
C.F.R. § 217 does not authorize timetables to change the federal speed limits set in 49 
C.F.R. § 213.9. The railroad's rules and timetable filings submitted to the FRA in 
accordance with section 217 are not approved or adopted by the FRA and therefore do not 
have the force of law. 
29. Even if defendant were bound by its timetable speed of 50 m.p.h., there still 
remain the questions of (a) whether Union Pacific was negligent in exceeding that speed, and 
(b) if the train's speed was a proximate cause of the collision. 
30. The train's speed in this matter was not a causal factor unless the train could have 
stopped, prior to collision, from the point at which plaintiff first saw the danger. The Court 
agrees with the holding in Dombeck v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. Co., 129 
N.W.2d 185 (Wise. 1964). In that case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that, even 
under an assumption that the train's speed was negligent, such speed as a matter of law could 
not be causal: 
In order to be causal the train's speed must either have misled . . . the 
driver of the car or it must have interfered with the control and 
management of the train to the extent of rendering it probable that such 
control and management would have otherwise been effective to have 
avoided the collision. 
Id. at 192. As to the first prong of this test, whether Brinkmeier, as driver, or plaintiff, as 
passenger, were misled as to the speed of the train, plaintiff stated in her affidavit that she 
did not see the train prior to the collision, nor did she hear the train blow its whistle or 
sound its horn prior to the collision. See Affidavit of Alicia Jensen, H 7-8, Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 3. In his recorded statement, Mr. Brinkmeier also 
stated that he did not hear the train or its horn. See the recorded statement of Bruce 
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Brinkmeier at 15, Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 4. The Court finds that, 
because both plaintiff and Brinkmeier admit that they were not looking or listening for a 
train, and because both stated that they never saw or heard the train prior to impact, neither 
could have been misled as to the speed of the train in estimating its time of arrival at the 
crossing. As to the second prong of this test, whether the train's speed interfered with the 
control and management of the train to the extent of rendering it probable that such control 
and management would have otherwise been effective to have avoided the collision, the 
Court finds that plaintiff has made no argument or produced any evidence that the train could 
have been stopped or sufficiently slowed to have allowed plaintiff's automobile to safely 
cross the tracks if the train had indeed been traveling 50 m.p.h. at the time the engineer 
activated the emergency brakes. Defendant, however, provided the Court with the Affidavit 
of Ryan Puffer, the engineer. See defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D. In his 
affidavit, Engineer Puffer stated that he placed the train into emergency braking as soon as 
he saw plaintiffs automobile, because it was his impression that the car was not going to 
stop and was going to come onto the track directly in front of the train. He further stated . 
that "[a] long heavy train takes a number of seconds, after placing it into emergency braking, 
before it even begins to slow down. On this occasion the train did not even begin to slow 
down before the accident happened." Id. at \ 11. In addition, defendant provided the Court 
with the affidavit of George E. Ohlsson, Manager of Operating Practices for Union Pacific 
Railroad Company. See defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit F. In his affidavit, 
Mr. Ohlsson stated that the small difference between the 50 m.p.h. timetable speed and an 
actual speed of approximately 51 m.p.h. "would not have made any significant difference in 
terms of how far the train would have gone before slowing down or stopping after the brakes 
were applied. A matter of 1 m.p.h. is, in my opinion, insignificant in terms of stopping time 
and distance." Id. at \ 10. 
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31. For these reasons, the Court finds that, even if the train had been traveling one or 
two miles above the timetable speed limit of 50 m.p.h., the train's speed was not a 
proximate cause of the accident. 
Dangerous Crossing 
32. According to the Utah Supreme court in English v. Southern Pacific Co., 45 P.47 
(1896), a crossing that is "more than ordinarily hazardous" places an additional duty of care 
on the railroad. Plaintiff argues that several conditions existed at the time of the accident 
which created a "more than ordinarily hazardous" crossing. These conditions include (a) an 
auction barn near the tracks accompanied by the busy nature of a livestock auction; and (b) 
trucks and trailers parked near the crossing which may have impeded vision or caused 
plaintiff to not hear the train as it approached. According to plaintiff, the accident occurred 
during a time when the commotion and noise of a livestock auction rendered the nearby 
crossing "more than ordinarily hazardous." 
33. More recently, the Utah Court of Appeals applied the English standard of "more 
than ordinarily hazardous" in Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. Co., 749 P.2d 
660 (Utah App. 1988). In Gleave, the plaintiff was hit by an empty coal train at a crossing 
in Springville, Utah. The court instructed the jury that "UDOT was statutorily given 
ultimate responsibility for crossing design and warning and safety devices and that, 
accordingly, [the jury] could not find Rio Grande negligent 'based upon any defects which 
might exist with respect to the design of the 1600 South crossing or based upon any problems 
you may perceive in the lack of traffic warning devices' there." Id. at 663. The jury found 
the crossing to be more than ordinarily hazardous and then farther found that Rio Grande 
failed to exercise reasonable care in driving the train across the roadway "given the 
crossing's design, its physical characteristics, and the existing warning signs." Id. at 664. 
The conditions that contributed to this "hazardous" crossing in Gleave included a dangerous 
crossing angle, a mound of earth, and a curving track. 
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34. In Duncan v. Union Pacific R.R., 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1992), a car containing a 
driver and three passengers was struck by a freight train in Tooele County on Droubay Road. 
While the road intersected the track at 43 degrees on the north and 136 degrees on the south, 
nothing obstructed the motorist's view of the tracks for several thousand feet. The Utah 
Supreme court in Duncan affirmed the trial court's finding that the "crossing was not 'more 
than ordinarily hazardous' because plaintiffs could not demonstrate, or even suggest, what 
more Union Pacific could have done to make this crossing safer, short of installing automatic 
warning lights and signs and gates, which admittedly was not its responsibility." Id. at 833. 
However, the Duncan court did reiterate the criteria used in the English case to determine 
whether a crossing would be found to be more than ordinarily hazardous: 
[A] crossing might be found to be more than ordinarily hazardous if it was 
in a thickly populated portion of a city; if the view of the tracks was 
obstructed because of the railroad itself or natural objects; if the crossing 
was frequented by heavy traffic so that approaching trains could not be 
heard; or if, for any reason, devices employed at the crossing were 
rendered inadequate to warn the public of the danger of an approaching 
train. 
Id. at 834 (quoting English, 13 Utah at 419-20, 45 P. at 50 (1896)). 
35. In light of the criteria set forth in English and reiterated in Duncan, the plaintiff in 
this case now argues that conditions present at the time of the accident, namely the auction 
barn and the traffic and commotion which accompany a livestock auction, meet the criteria of 
a "more than ordinarily hazardous" crossing. Plaintiff further argues that a factfinder should 
therefore be allowed to determine if the crossing was hazardous and, if so, whether 
defendant exercised reasonable care when driving the train across this particular railroad 
crossing. 
36. While not agreeing that the crossing was more than ordinarily hazardous, defendant 
argues that, assuming arguendo, "such a scenario does not impose a duty upon Union Pacific 
to reduce the train's speed below the federally mandated limit." See defendant's 
Memorandum in Support at 9, f 1. Defendant argues that the plaintiff in Easterwood also 
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alleged unsafe crossing conditions requiring additional warning devices. However, despite 
the Easterwood court's finding that plaintiff may have had a viable claim for an unsafe 
crossing, the Court found that the railroad had no duty to reduce the train's speed below the 
federal limit. Defendant argues that its train was traveling 10 m.p.h. below the federal limit 
and that because the FRA sets train speeds with crossing safety concerns already in mind, 
plaintiffs allegation of defendant's failure to reduce the speed of its train through the "more 
than ordinarily hazardous" crossing is unfounded. 
37. Defendant further argues that, when a crossing is deemed to be extrahazardous, a 
railroad's duty of care is limited to those unsafe conditions which it created or over which it 
has responsibility. See defendant's Reply Memorandum at 13. Defendant cites Gleave v. 
Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R., 749 P.2d 660 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), and Duncan v. 
Union Pacific R. Co., 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1990), in alleging that a railroad's duty of care 
extends only to obstructions to view or sound caused by the railroad or located on railroad 
right of way or property. Defendant then cites Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-19, which places a 
duty of care on property owners to remove vegetation or other obstructions on their property -
which constitute a traffic hazard by obstructing the view of any motor vehicle operator, and 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-14 et seq., which delegates to the Utah Department of Transportation 
(UDOT) the responsibility for regulating the safe travel of motorists on roads and highways, 
including those which pass over and across railroad tracks. 
38. This Court finds that, even if a jury could determine the existence of conditions that 
would make the accident site a "more than ordinarily hazardous" crossing, those conditions 
were not the responsibility of defendant. The noise around the auction was not something 
within defendant's control. The fact that there were "No Parking" signs posted around the 
area following the accident to prevent parked cars from obstructing drivers' views of the 
railroad track does not imply any lack of care on defendant's part prior to the accident, since 
such precautions are not the defendant's responsibility. 
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39. For these reasons, the Court finds that, even if the railroad crossing was a "more 
than ordinarily hazardous" crossing when a livestock auction was in progress, any unusually 
hazardous conditions resulting from the auction were not defendant's responsibility. 
U.C.A § 56-1-14 (Locomotive Bells & Whistles) 
40. Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-14 governs the operation of locomotive whistle and bell 
devices at public railroad crossings. It provides as follows: 
Every locomotive shall be provided with a bell which shall be rung 
continuously from a point not less than than 80 rods from any city or town 
street or public highway grade crossing until such city or town street or 
public highway grade shall be crossed, but, except in towns and at 
terminal points, the sounding of the locomotive whistle or siren at least 
1/4 of a mile before reaching any such grade crossing shall be deemed 
equivalent to ringing the bell as aforesaid. . . 
Id. According to defendant, where the grade crossing is in a rural area such as the one in 
question, the requirement is that either the bell or the whistle must be operated beginning "at 
least" 1320 feet from the crossing. Defendant argues that Engineer Puffer sounded both the 
bell and the whistle approximately 1/4 of a mile from the crossing, well in excess of the 
statutorily required distance of 1320 feet. 
41. Plaintiff argues that neither the driver nor the passenger of the car ever heard the 
train's whistle or bells prior to the accident. See Affidavit of Alicia Jensen, Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 3, and the recorded statement of Bruce Brinkmeier, 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 4. Plaintiff alleges that the Pulse Electronics 
graph, attached to the Affidavit of Bruce Reading, indicates that no whistles or bells were 
sounded by the train as it approached the crossing. Plaintiff points to the statements of 
several witnesses who were near the crossing at the time of the accident. In their voluntary 
statements to police, Gerald and Whitney Hill made no mention of the train's whistle or bells 
at the time of the accident. Other witnesses also made voluntary statements to police and 
said nothing about hearing the train's whistle or bells at the time of the accident. However, 
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plaintiff has not provided the Court with any such statements in affidavit form, as required 
by Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
42. The failure of the Pulse Electronics graph to record the whistle or bells of the train 
prior to the accident is explained by George E. Ohlsson in his Supplemental Affidavit. Mr. 
Ohlsson stated that the event recorder device installed on the locomotive used only 8-track 
cassettes, which do not have sufficient channels to record everything relative to the operation 
of the train; specifically, the 8-track cassette does not have a channel for showing whether 
the horn or whistle was being sounded. See Supplemental Affidavit of George E. Ohlsson, \ 
2. Mr. Ohlsson further stated that Union Pacific is beginning to replace the 8-track cassette 
event recorders with solid state event recorders which are capable of recording the sounding 
of a train's whistle. Id. at ^ 4. Furthermore, there is testimony in the police record to 
support defendant's claim that the train did sound its whistle and bells at some point before 
reaching the crossing, and that there were witnesses to the accident who did hear the train's 
whistle and bells. See defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit A (Voluntary 
Statements of Johnny Starks and Robert Craw). Ryan Puffer, engineer of the train, stated 
that he began sounding the whistle and the bells approximately 1/4 mile away from the 
crossing at 5950 South, and then continued operating the bells and whistle from 5950 South 
for another 1100 feet until the train reached the crossing at 650 West where the accident 
occurred. See defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit C. 
43. The Court finds that, despite plaintiffs reference to the voluntary statements of 
witnesses who said nothing about having heard the train's bells or whistle, plaintiff did not 
submit any affidavits to that effect in accordance with the requirements of Rule 4-501 of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Furthermore, there is no evidence to indicate that 
those witnesses were in a position to hear the bells and whistles if they had in fact been 
sounded. Conversely, defendant submitted the affidavit of the train's engineer, Ryan Puffer, 
who stated that he checked the train prior to leaving Milford to verify that the brakes, 
whistle, and headlights worked properly. Mr. Puffer also stated that he sounded the train's 
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bells and whistles for over 1/4 of a mile prior to reaching the crossing at 5950 South, and 
continued to sound the whistle beyond that crossing because he knew there was another 
crossing (the 650 West crossing) shortly beyond the 5950 South crossing. Finally, Mr. 
Puffer stated that he was sounding the whistle continuously as he watched the truck and horse 
trailer cross the tracks just ahead of plaintiffs automobile. 
44. The Court finds the affidavit evidence presented is uncontradicted and that 
defendant did appropriately sound the train's bells and whistle as warning. 
Conclusion 
45. The Court concludes (a) that the speed of defendant's train was not a proximate 
cause of the accident; (b) that defendant was not responsible for any conditions which may 
have been present at the time of the accident and creating a "more than ordinarily hazardous" 
crossing; and (c) that defendant did sound the train's bells and whistle as it approached the 
crossing. Therefore, the Court finds no genuine issues of material fact remain as to 
defendant's liability to plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court grants defendant's Motion For 
Summary Judgment. 
Counsel for defendant is to prepare, within 15 days of the date hereof, an order 
consistent with the terms of this decision and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to 
form prior to submission to the Court for signature. 
Dated at Provo, Utah this 15th day of May, 1995. 
B>T] 
/ " . 
C
—WUDGffc BOYD L. PARK 
cc: J. Clare Williams 
Allen Young 
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J. CLARE WILLIAMS, #3490 
MORRIS O HAGOERTY, #5283 
Attorneys for Defendant 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY 
406 West 100 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1151 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALECIA JENSEN, ) 
) ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ) 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD ) 
COMPANY ) Civil No. 940400280 
Defendant. ) Judge Boyd L. Park 
Defendant, Union Pacific Railroad Company's Motion for Summary Judgment came on for 
hearing by the Court on April 17, 1995; with defendant being represented by J. Clare Williams 
and plaintiff, who was present in the courtroom, being represented by Allen K. Young; and with 
the parties having filed written briefs and exhibits and having argued their respective positions to 
the Court, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, now rules as follows: 
The Court finds and concludes: 
(1) That the speed of defendant's train was not a proximate cause of the 
accident; 
(2) That defendant was not responsible for any conditions which may have 
been present at the time of the accident and created a "more than ordinarily hazardous" 
crossing; and 
(3) That defendant did sound the train's bell and whistle as it approached the 
crossing. 
Therefore, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact to prevent 
it from acting on defendant's motion as a matter of law. 
Accordingly, the Court hereby grants defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
orders plaintiffs Complaint dismissed w t^h prejudice, with each party to pay its own costs and 
expenses. 
DATED this tf day of June, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form this day 
of , 1995. 
Allen K. Young 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
